

Message Text

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FOLLOWING REPEAT USNATO 5413 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
MOSCOW GENEVA 6 OCT.

QUOTE: S E C R E T USNATO 5413

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: NATO, PARM
SUBJ: NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS FALL 1976 MEETING

REF: USNATO 4572

SUMMARY: NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERT'S OCTOBER 4-5 MEETING
COVERED BROAD RANGE OF MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT ISSUES
PER AGENDA SET OUT REFTEL, FOCUSING PARTICULARLY ON
FORTHCOMING DISARMAMENT DEBATE IN 1976 UNGA. TOPICS
GIVEN MOST EMPHASIS INCLUDED NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
FOLLOW-UP, CTB AND OTHER TEST BAN ISSUES, SOVIET
NON-USE OF FORCE INITIATIVE, HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICT, CW, ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION, SPECIAL
SPECIAL UNGA SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, AND
CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. ALTHOUGH THERE
WERE DIFFERENCES ON CERTAIN TOPICS, DISCUSSION
REVEALED SUBSTANTIAL AREAS OF AGREEMENT, BOTH
SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL, ON MOST ISSUES. END
SUMMARY.

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1. NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE FOLLOW-UP. EXPERTS
DISCUSSED AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH HOW TO DEAL WITH
ITEM AT 1976 UNGA. SLOSS (US), OBSERVING THAT
THIS WAS IMPORTANT AND POTENTIALLY HIGHLY CON-

TENTIOUS ISSUE, SAID MAJOR US AIM WAS OUTCOME AS SUPPORTIVE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND NPG REGIME AS POSSIBLE. THERE WAS SERIOUS HAZARD, HOWEVER, THAT ACTIVIST NON-ALIGNED NPT PARTIES, E.G., MEXICO AND YUGOSLAVIA, COULD MOUNT CAMPAIGN BASED ON ALLEGED FAILURE OF THE THREE NUCLEAR WEAPON PARTIES (DEPOSITARIES) TO MEET OBLIGATIONS UNDER NPT ARTICLE VI (NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT) AND ARTICLE IV (PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY). SLOSS CONTINUED THAT IF NON-ALIGNED OCCUPIED FIELD WITH RADICAL RESOLUTIONS NONE OF WHICH ARE ACCEPTABLE TO DEPOSITARIES, RESULT COULD BE SEEN AS TREATY REGIME SHARPLY DIVIDED BETWEEN NWS AND NNWS PARTIES; SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE COULD BE EXPLOITED BY COUNTRIES HOSTILE TO NPT AND IN ANY CASE WOULD BE GENERALLY HARMFUL TO OUR MUTUAL NONPROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES. ACCORDINGLY, IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE FOR ALLIES TO DEVELOP, IN CONJUNCTION WITH USSR AND MODERATE NON-ALIGNED NPT PARTIES, A WIDELY ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION DEMONSTRATING THAT NPT CONTINUES TO ENJOY EXTENSIVE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.

3. OTHER EXPERTS AGREED THAT NPT REVCON COULD PROVE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT ISSUE AT UNGA THIS FALL, AND THAT ALLIES SHOULD TRY TO AVOID CONFRONTATION WITH NON-ALIGNED PARTIES AND TO ACHIEVE A BALANCED RES IF POSSIBLE. OPINIONS DIFFERED, HOWEVER, AS TO FEASIBILITY OF ACHIEVING SUCH A RES IN FACE OF EXPECTED HARD-LINE NON-ALIGNED POSITIONS. EDMONDS (UK) CAUTIONED THAT ALTHOUGH SWEDEN WAS IN "DRIVER'S SEAT" IN LIGHT OF ITS CONTROL ROLE AT REVCON, SWEDES HAD EXPRESSED DOUBTS TO HIM ON THIS SCORE. EDMONDS AND SLOSS (US) SUGGESTED THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF POSITIVE ACTIONS THAT COULD BE CITED SINCE REVCON, AND THAT A BROADLY WORDED RES CITING PRO-

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GRESS ACHIEVED SINCE REVCON IN TECHNICAL SPHERE, INCREASE IN NPT ADHERENCES, AND ENCOURAGING FURTHER NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS, MIGHT NEVERTHELESS BE ATTAINABLE OBJECTIVE. EDMONDS ADDED THAT UK FALLBACK WAS TO SEEK TO HAVE NO RESOLUTION AT ALL UNDER THE NPT ITEM. SLYFIELD (CANADA), SCHEON (DENMARK) AND ONKELINX (BELGIUM), ALTHOUGH AGREEING THAT EITHER OUTCOME WOULD BE BETTER THAN CRITICAL RESOLUTIONS, WERE DOUBTFUL EITHER THAT BROADLY WORDED RES WOULD RECEIVE GENERAL SUPPORT OR THAT MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES WOULD STAND FOR NO RESOLUTION ON SUBJECT.

4. SLYFIELD THOUGHT NON-ALIGNED WOULD HAVE SOME BASIS

FOR CRITICISM, INASMUCH AS "NOT MUCH HAS HAPPENED" SINCE REVCON. HE SUGGESTED THAT IN END ALLIES COULD BE LEFT WITH DAMAGE-LIMITING EFFORT. MISTRAL (FRANCE) DECLARED HIS UNDERSTANDING FOR THE CONCERNS THAT HE BEEN EXPRESSED AND SAID FRENCH WOULD TRY TO AVOID "OVERDRAMATIZING" THE ISSUE. HOWEVER, HE FORESAW TOUGH GOING IN NEW YORK. FERRETTI (ITALY) SHARED THIS APPRAISAL, AND URGED ESPECIALLY CLOSE ALLIED CONSULTATION ON THE ISSUE AT THE UNGA. EXPERTS AGREED THIS WOULD BE NECESSARY.

5. IAEA STUDY OF PNES. EDMONDS (UK) REVIEWED THE WORK THUS FAR OF THE IAEA ADVISORY GROUP ON PNEA, NOTING THAT IT HAD SHOWN THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF PNES AND DESIRABILITY OF INCREASED ATTENTION TO THEIR HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECTS. EDMONDS CAUTIONED THAT RAPID PROGRESS SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED IN THIS FIELD. SLYFIELD (CANADA) AND VAN DER WALK (NETHERLANDS) SAID THEIR COUNTRIES WERE NOT INTERESTED IN SPONSORING ANOTHER PNE RES AT 1976 UNGA, CONSIDERING THAT WORK ON PNES WAS PROCEEDING SATISFACTORILY. HAUBER (FRG) ON OTHER HAND FEARED THAT IF ALLIES ABANDONED SUBJECT, THIS COULD OPEN WAY FOR RADICAL MEXICAN RES. HE ARGUED THAT LAST YEAR'S RES, INTRODUCED BY SEVERAL ALLIES, HAD HELPFULLY SPLIT NON-ALIGNED ON ISSUE, ISOLATING THOSE AGEAINT NPT. HAUBER SUGGESTED THAT A FAVORABLE PNE RES COULD COMPENSATE FOR AN UNSATISFACTORY ONE ON NPT REVCON, AND THAT ALLIES
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COULD REACH UNDERSTANDING WITH SWEDES IN THIS CONNECTION. HIS SUGGESTION, HOWEVER, PRODUCED NO RESPONSE AMONG OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

6. HAUBER ALSO BROUGHT UP FRG IDEA OF MODEL "UMBRELLA AGREEMENT" ON PNE SERVICES, DEPICTING IT IN EFFECT AS STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES WHICH COULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE MADE CONCRETE WITH APPROPRIATE BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVING SPECIFIC COUNTRIES. IFFT (US) SAID USG CONSIDERED IT WOULD BE PREMATURE AT THIS STAGE TO TRY TO DRAFT ANY FORM OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FOR PNE SERVICES. EDMONDS (UK) SUPPORTED THIS POINT.

7. CTB. HAUBER SAID HIS COUNTRY FAVORS EARLY CTB, BUT IS NOT OPTIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS BECAUSE OF POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS. HE SAW DIVIDED US OPINION ON CTB, NOTING CARTER PROPOSAL FOR FIVE-YEAR MORATORIUM ON WEAPONS AND PNE TESTS, BUT DOUBTED SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO FOREGO PNES. ON PNE PROBLEM, HAUBER NOTED THAT USSR MAINTAINED IT HAD BEEN SOLVED BUT THAT FRG (AND US) DID NOT AGREE. HE THEREFORE QUESTIONED WHETHER PNE ACCOMMODATION WOULD BE POSSIBLE UNDER CTB AND URGED CONSIDERATION OF USING "STANDARDIZED" PNE DEVICES AS

POSSIBLE SOLUTION.

8. SEVERAL EXPERTS RAISED GROMYKO SEPTEMBER 28 UNGA SPEECH AND ASSOCIATED SOVIET MEMO, POINTING TO INDICATIONS OF GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON VERIFICATION. SLOSS AND IFFT (US) SAID US WAS STUDYING SOVIET TEXTS, BUT THAT OUR POSITION ON CTB VERIFICATION IS UNCHANGED. US EXPERTS STRESSED THAT PNET DOES NOT SOLVE PNE PROBLEM UNDER CTB AS SOVIETS CLAIM. THEY SAID US DOES NOT AT PRESENT SEE ANY SATISFACTORY SCHEME FOR ACCOMMODATING PNES UNDER CTB, BUT THAT PROBLEM MERITS FURTHER STUDY.

9. ON CCD-SPONSORED SEISMOLOGICAL EXPERTS STUDY OF DETECTION/IDENTIFICATION CAPABILITIES, ONKELINX (BELGIUM) SAID BELGIANS PLANNED TO TAX SOVIETS IN UNGA FOR NOT TAKING PART. SLYFIELD (CANADA) AND FERRETTI (ITALY) POINTED TO SWEDISH EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE USSR PARTICIPATION.
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PARTICIPATION AND SAID SWEDES SAW SOME HOPE THAT SOVIETS, OR AT LEAST ONE OR MORE EAST EUROPEANS, MAY PARTICIPATE WHEN GROUP NEXT MEETS EARLY IN 1977. HAUBER (FRG) EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM ABOUT VALUE OF EXPERTS' WORK; SLOSS (US) SAID WE BELIEVED GROUP HAD MADE GOOD START AND ANTICIPATED USEFUL RESULTS FROM THE STUDY.

10. HAUBER (FRG) ASKED WHETHER ANY PARTICIPANT WAS INTERESTED IN SEEKING TO PROMOTE MODERATE CTB RESOLUTION AT UNGA THIS YEAR. BOTH CANADA AND NETHERLANDS, PREVIOUSLY INVOLVED IN SUCH PROJECTS, REPLIED IN NEGATIVE. THEY SAID AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND SWEDEN WERE ALSO UNWILLING TO TAKE LEAD. HAUBER SAID FRG

LIKELIKE WAS DISINCLINED TO TAKE SUCH AN INITIATIVE, BUT OPINED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY BAD RESULT TO HAVE BEFORE UNGA ONLY AN ANTICIPATED SHARPLY CONDEMNATORY MEXICAN RES AND A USSR RES SUPPORTING UNACCEPTABLE 1975 SOVIET CTB INITIATIVE. EDMONDS (UK) REJOINED THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE SO UNDESIRABLE SINCE IT WOULD OFFER EASILY EXPLICABLE GROUNDS FOR ABSTENTION OR EVEN, PERHAPS, NEGATIVE VOTE. (COMMENT: DELOFFS PLAN TO TAKE FURTHER SOUNDINGS ON INTENTIONS REGARDING CTB RES WITH PREVIOUSLY ACTIVIST COUNTRIES, INCLUDING JAPANESE, DURING GENEVA CONSULTATIONS OCT 7-8.)

11. SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY (SACT) REVIEW CONFERENCE. EDMONDS (UK), AS REPRESENTATIVE OF A DEPOSITARY POWER, TOOK LEAD IN DISCUSSING PREPARATIONS FOR SACT REVCON. HE NOTED THAT PREPARATION COMMITTEE IS TO MEET FEB 7-11, 1977 AND THAT UNDER PRESENT PLANNING REVCON ITSELF WOULD MEET IN SECOND HALF OF AUGUST,

INVOLVING CONFLICT WITH CCD SUMMER SESSION. PARTICIPANTS AGREED IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO SHIFT CONFERENCE TO EARLY-TO-MID JUNE AND EDMONDS UNDERTOOK TO EXPLORE THIS POSSIBILITY WITH UN SECRETARIAT WHICH WILL PROVIDE CONFERENCE SERVICES. PARTICIPANTS ALSO AGREED THAT PREPCOM SHOULD CONFINE ITSELF TO PROCEDURAL ISSUES, AMONG WHICH FINANCING WOULD BE BIGGEST PROBLEM, THAT FINNISH FOREIGN OFFICE DISARMAMENT HEAD PASTINEN WOULD BE GOOD CHOICE FOR CONFERENCE PRESIDENT, AND (PER US SUGGESTION) THAT
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SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF REVCON SHOULD BE ON NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS' SPRING 1977 AGENDA. BELGIAN AND NETHERLANDS REPS WARNED THAT SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS (E.G., FOR FURTHER DEMILITARIZATION OF THE SEABED COULD POSE MORE DIFFICULTIES AT REVCON THAN NOW SEEMED ANTICIPATED.

1. NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES (NWFZ) AND ZONES OF PEACE. CHAIRMAN OBSERVED THAT THIS HAD BEEN STANDARD TOPIC AT NUMBER OF PREVIOUS EXPERTS' MEETINGS BUT THAT COLOMBO CONFERENCE NOW HAD GIVEN PARTICULAR EMPHASIS TO INDIAN OCEAN PEACE ZONE (IOPZ) INITIATIVE. FERRETTI (ITALY) RESPONDED BY POINTING TO YUGOSLAVS' ACTIVITY ON NWFZ ISSUES AND PARTICULARLY THEIR IDEA FOR "XZONE OF PEACE" IN MEDITERRANEAN. FERRETTI STATED, HOWEVER, THAT FOREIGN MINISTER MINIC HAD STRESSED TO ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN BELGRADE THAT THIS IDEA WAS STILL IN EMBRYO FORM, AND THAT YUGOSLAVS RECOGNIZE US-SOVIET OVERRIDING INTERESTS IN THIS AREA. FERRETTI ACCORDINGLY THOUGH YUGOSLAVS WOULD NOT PRESS MEDITERRANEAN PEACE ZONE PROPOSAL VERY HARD AT THIS UNGA SESSION. ANDRAEA (FRG) SAID THAT ON BASIS OF THEIR OWN DISCUSSIONS WITH YUGOSLAVS, GERMANS HAD SAME VIEW.

13. SLOSS (US) SUGGESTED THAT EXPERTS SHOULD APPRAISE THE APPARENT SHIFT IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON PARTICIPATION IN AN INDIAN OCEAN CONFERENCE, CONVEYED IN GROMYKO'S SPEECH TO UNGA SEPTEMBER 28. SLOSS, STRESSING THAT US VIEWS ON IOPZ MERITS WERE UNCHANGED, THOUGHT USSR POSITION NEEDED FURTHER CLARIFICATION. EDMONDS (UK) AND MISTRAL (FRANCE) SHARED VIEW THAT USSR POSITION REPRESENTED CHANGE REGARDING PROCEDURE RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE AND STATED THEIR GOVERNMENTS' VIEWS ON IOPZ WERE NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE. MISTRAL, IN PARTICULAR, STRESSED DANGERS, IF IOPZ PROPOSAL WERE REALIZED, AS PRECEDENT FOR MEDITERRANEAN. OTHER EXPERTS, NOTABLY ONKELINX (BELGIUM), STRESSED TACTICAL DIFFICULTIES AT UNGA THAT WERE POSED BY SOVIETS' IOPZ SHIFT. ONKELINX SAW DANGER OF WESTERN ISOLATION IF NON-ALIGNED AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WERE ABLE TO AGREE ON INDIAN OCEAN INITIATIVE, WHEREAS FORMERLY NATO AND WP HAD ABSTAINED IN CONCERT ON THAT INITIATIVE.

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14. IN CONJUNCTION WITH NWFZ/PEACE ZONE DISCUSSION, VAN DER WALK (NETHERLANDS) RAISED QUESTION OF NON-USE ASSURANCES TO NNWS BY NWS. RECALLING ABORTIVE PAKISTANI INITIATIVE ON THIS ISSUE LAST YEAR, HE SAID NETHERLANDS HAD NOT BEEN CONVINCED BY US ARGUMENT AGAINST SUCH ASSURANCES, AT LEAST RESPECTING STATE NOT PROTECTED BY AN ALLIANCE. SLYFIELD (CANADA) SAID THE PAKISTANIS HAD TOLD CANADIANS THEY WERE THINKING OF ANOTHER NON-USE INITIATIVE AT THE 1976 UNGA, AND CIRCULATED THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT PAKISTANI RESOLUTION. VAN DER WALK ALSO CIRCULATED OPERATIVE SECTION, AS A MODIFICATION OF THE PAKISTANI DRAFT, FOR PARTICIPANTS' CONSIDERATION. (BOTH TEXTS BEING SENT DEPARTMENT SEPTEL.) AFTER NWS REPRESENTATIVES INDICATED THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THE PAKISTANI APPROACH, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE QUESTION OF DEALING FURTHER WITH THIS ISSUE WOULD BE LEFT OPEN FOR UNGA DELEGATIONS.

15. NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF). MISTRAL (FRANCE) SAID FRENCH WERE CONCERNED BY REVIVAL OF INITIATIVE IN VIEW OF INVESTMENT OF USSR PRESTIGE. HE THOUGHT REVISIONS IN PROPOSAL TO DILUTE PREVIOUS FOCUS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD MAKE ITEM MORE ATTRACTIVE TO NON-ALIGNED AT UNGA AND THUS MORE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE. FERRETTI (ITALY) SAID THAT ITALIANS FOUND NEW PROPOSAL MORE CONGENIAL THAN IN 1972 AND MIGHT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT IT, IF MINOR CHANGES WERE MADE IN ARTICLE III OF SOVIET DRAFT TREATY AND IF ITALY WOULD NOT THEREBY BE ISOLATED FROM ALLIES. AFTER NUMEROUS REPS EXPRESSED THEMSELVES ON NUF IN STRONGLY NEGATIVE TERMS, ABOVE ALL BECAUSE OF PROPOSAL'S IMPLICATIONS FOR UN CHARTER, FERRETTI INDICATED THAT HAD SETTLED THE QUESTION FOR ITALY.

16. HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICT AND "INDISCRIMINATE" WEAPONS. MOST PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING ANDERSON (US), TOOK ESSENTIALLY CONSERVATIVE POSITIONS ON POSSIBLE PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION OF USE OF WEAPONS IN QUESTION. MUCH DISCUSSION FOCUSSED ON NATO IMS DRAFT STUDY ON POTENTIAL MILITARY EFFECTS OF SUCH PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION, REVEALING APPARENT MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN
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STAFFAND DUTCH REGARDING NETHERLANDS PROPOSAL ON RESTRICTIONS AGAINST INCENDIARIES.

17. SEVERAL PARTICIPANTS EXPRESSED VIEW THAT WEST, BY HAVING MADE SEVERAL PROPOSALS RESPECTING WEAPONS IN QUESTION, HAD TAKEN ADVANTGIOUS PUBLIC POSTURE THAT

CONTRASTED WITH EASTERN IMMOBILISM. ON OTHER HAND, PARTICIPANTS WERE CAUTIONED THAT SEDEDS DID NOT THINK THEY COULD FLOAT PURELY PROCEDURAL UNGA RESOLUTION OF TYPE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS LAST YEAR, IN VIEW OF COLOMBO NON-LAIGNED CONFERENCE'S CALL FOR BAN ON ANPALM AND OTHER INCENDIARIES.

18. CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW). EDMONDS (UK) CIRCULATED DRAFT CW RESOLUTION DEVELOPED BY UK ON BASIS OF LAST YEAR'S UNGA RES ON CW ORIGINATED BY POLAND. HE SAID BRITISH THOUGHT WEST COULD TAKE INITIATIVE ON CW THIS YEAR, AND THAT SOME COUNTRY OTHER THAN US OR UK SHOULD PUT IT FORWARD IN UN. DRAFT (TEXT BEING SENT SEPTTEL) GOT FAVORABLE INITIAL REACTION FROM BELGIAN, CANADIAN, ITALIAN AND FRG EXPERTS. ON BASIS OF CAUTIONARY PROCEDURAL COMMENT BY SLOSS (US), PARTICIPANTS AGREED ON NEED TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH POLES IN ADVANCE. (COMMENT: WE FORESEE POSSIBLE NEED TO DISSUADE UK AND OTHER WESTERN DELS FROM INITIATING CW RES TO AVOID BEING FORCED TO NEGOTIATE BACK FROM TEXT THAT IS ALREADY AT LIMIT OF ACCEPTABILITY) END COMMENT.

19. HAUBER (FRG) URGED GREATER ALLIANCE CONSULTATION LEADING TO AGREEMENT ON CW PRINCIPLES. REGARDING UK DRAFT CONVENTION, HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT GERMAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MIGHT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED, AND URGED MORE PRECISE DEFINITIONS OF "TOXICITY" AND "LETHAL". HE ALSO QUESTIONED ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS WOULD ARISE UPON SIGNATURE RATHER THAN REATIFICATION, AND EXPRESSED DOUBTS REGARDING UTILITY OF INSPECTING ONLY DECLARED PLANTS ON SOVIET SIDE. HAUBER FURTHER STRESSED NEED TO AVOID SITUATION ENCOUNTERED IN ENMOD NEGOTIATION, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS US AND USSR ARRAYED AGAINST OTHERS, AND SAID PROCEDURES USED FOR ENMOD NEGOTIATION WOULD NOT BE SUITABLE FOR CW. ONKELINX (BELGIUM) AND FERRETTIN
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(ITALY) ALSO CALLED FOR COORDINATION, THOUGH IN Milder TERMS.

20. SLOSS (US) WELCOMED UK DRAFT TREATY AND SAID US HOPES TO PROVIDE DETAILED COMMENTS EARLY IN SPRING CCD SESSION. HE RECOGNIZED IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATIONS AND NOTED US VIEWS ON CW WERE SET FORTH IN APRIL CCD STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MARTIN. HE DESCRIBED US-USSR TECHNICAL BILATERALS LAST AUGUST AS USEFUL, BUT NOTED THAT RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ON VERIFICATION STILL DIFFER SUBSTANTIALLY AND WE ARE FAR FROM NEGOTIATING TREATY TEXT. NO QUESTIONS WERE RAISED REGARDING THESE CONSULTATIONS.

2. ENMOD. SLOSS (US) DESCRIBED US PLANS FOR HANDLING THE ISSUE AT THE UNGA AND DISTRIBUTED TEXT OF DRAFT

RESOLUTION WHICH HE SAID HAD SOVIET CONCURRENCE. HE INDICATED US AND SOVIETS WOULD SEEK BALANCED CO-SPONSORSHIP AMONG EASTERN, WESTERN AND NON-ALIGNED DELEGATIONS AND WOULD ASK FINNS TO TAKE THE LEAD IN NEW YORK. HE STRESSED KEY TO SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME WAS SUFFICIENT NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT, AND THAT WE WERE NOT YET SURE WHAT MEXICAN AND ARGENTINE TACTICS WOULD BE

22. EXPERTS OF FRG, UK, DENMARK, ITALY AND CANADA INDICATED SUPPORT FOR PROPOSED US APPROACH AND TENTATIVE SUPPORT FOR DRAFT RESOLUTION. MISTRAL (FRANCE), WHILE DESCRIBING THE DRAFT TREATY AS LARGELY RHETORICAL, INDICATED INITIAL REACTION TO DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS FAVORABLE. ONKELINX (BELGIUM), WHILE ENDORSING RESOLUTION, NOTED WE SHOULD NOT ATTACH TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THIS TREATY AT THE EXPENSE OF RESTRAINT ON CURRENT WEAPONS, AND SAID IT WAS THEIR VIEW SOVIETS WERE EXAGGERATING IMPORTANCE OF ENMOD. BOTH UK AND FRG EXPERTS INDICATED OPTIMISM THAT CURRENT DRAFT TREATY LANGUAGE COULD GET SUPPORT OF A MAJORITY OF UNGA MEMBERS AND BOTH EXPRESSED STRONG OPPOSITION TO RETURNING TREATY TO CCD. SLOSS AGREED ON LATTER POINT AND SAID IT MIGHT BE USEABLE AS A TALKING POINT WITH NON-ALIGNED THAT RETURN OF ENMOD TEXT TO CCD FOR FURTHER WORK WOULD INTERFERE WITH MORE IMPORTANT BUSINESS.

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23. EDMONDS (UK) SAID SWEDES HAD TOLD THEM THEY EXPECTED MAXIMUM OF 25 ABSTENTIONS ON A RESOLUTION ENDORSING CURRENT ENMOT TEXT. FERRETTI (ITALY) ALSO THOUGHT NON-ALIGNED WOULD BE FAR FROM UNANIMOUS IN THEIR ATTITUDES ON SUCH A RES; HE SAID ITALY WOULD SEEK TO PERSUADE LATIN AMERICAN DELEGATIONS IN PARTICULAR THAT PRESENT TREATY TEXT WAS WORTH SUPPORTING.

24. CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. SLOSS (US) ADE PRESENTATION BASED ON SUGGESTIONS FOR POSSIBLE NATO ACTION IN PAPER PREVIOUSLY DISTRIBUTED TO NATO POLADS, ENDING WITH SUGGESTION OF FURTHER POLAD DISCUSSION ON THIS TOPIC. COMMENTS BY MOST OTHER DELEGATIONS WERE PRELIMINARY AND TENTATIVE. HOWEVER, UK, FRG, BELGIAN, DUTCH, ITALIAN, DANISH AND CANADIAN EXPERTS WELCOMED US PAPER AND SAID THEY WOULD STUDY FURTHER. FRENCH EXPERT (MISTRAL) MADE RATHER LENGTHY COMMENT STRESSING POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN COORDINATED ACTION AMONG

SUPPLIERS, PARTICULARLY EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE NEGATIVE REACTION OF RECIPIENTS TO CONCERTED ACTION BY SUPPLIERS. HOWEVER, HE ALSO MADE POSITIVE COMMENTS ON US PAPER AND SAID HIS EXPERTS WOULD STUDY IT FURTHER. IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT QUESTION FROM THE

CHAIRMAN AS TO WHETHER FRANCE COULD AGREE TO POLAD DISCUSSION, MISTRAL SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO RESERVE HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION.

25. IN RESPONSE TO MISTRAL, SLOSS AGREED THAT THE PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL PITFALLS INVOLVED IN COORDINATING ARMS TRANSFER POLICIES IN THE ALLIANCE WERE SUBSTANTIAL AND THAT THEY INVOLVED IMPORTANT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ISSUES. THIS IS WHY USG WAS SUGGESTING CONSIDERATION BY POLADS--A MORE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR DISCUSSING THESE BROADER ISSUES THAN THE DISARMAMENT EXPERTS. SLOSS ALSO SUGGESTED THAT INITIAL DISCUSSION SHOULD DEAL WITH THE BROAD ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CLOSER NATO COOPERATION IN THIS AREA AND VARIOUS POSSIBLE FORMS OF COOPERATION. ONLY IF THIS INITIAL DISCUSSION DEMONSTRATES THERE WAS SOMETHING WORTH DOING AS AN ALLIANCE WOULD WE MOVE ON TO TRY
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TO DECIDE ON SPECIFIC FORMS OF COOPERATION.

26. HAUBER (FRG) ASKED IF US INTENDED TO CONSULT ALLIES AND DEVELOP ALLIANCE POLICIES ON ARMS TRANSFERS BEFORE APPROACHING SOVIETS. SLOSS REPLIED THAT US WOULD NORMALLY WISH TO DO THIS, BUT WOULD NOT WISH TO MAKE HARD AND FAST RULE. HE NOTED THAT SPECIFIC MECHANISM FOR SUCH CONSULTATION ON ARMS TRANSFER MATTERS DID NOT APPEAR TO EXIST IN NATO, AND CERTAINLY THERE WERE, AS YET, NO COMMON POLICIES.

27. ONKELINX (BELGIUM) NOTED SPEECH BY HIS FOREIGN MINISTER AT UNGA AND INDICATED BELGIUM WAS CONSIDERING RESOLUTION CALLING FOR UN STUDY OF REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL. SLOSS (US) INDICATED US WOULD CONSIDER THIS IDEA, BUT DID NOT CONSIDER IT A SUBSTITUTE FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS RESTRAINTS DISCUSSION IN NATO.

28. DISARMAMENT FORUMS. EXPERTS BRIEFLY DISCUSSED REPORT ON UN ROLE IN DISARMAMENT, AGREEING THAT REPORT WAS ACCEPTABLE BUT RESERVING ON FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS, WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, AND QUESTION OF SPECIAL UNGA SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, WITH EMPHASIS ON LATTER. THERE WAS UNANIMITY THAT SSOD WAS UNAVOIDABLE. SEVERAL EXPERTS OBSERVED THAT CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY COULD ARISE IN SETTING TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR SPECIAL SESSION IN LIGHT OF DIRECT LINKAGE TO WDC ASSERTED BY SOVIETS AND INFERRED BY COLOMBO NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE. MOST PARTICIPANTS APPEARED TO AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE ADVISABLE TO TAKE PART IN PREPARATORY ACTIVITY IN EFFORT TO SHAPE SSOD AS CONSTRUCTIVELY AS POSSIBLE. STRAUSS-HUPE UNQUOTE ROBINSON

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Message Attributes

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Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
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